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Insurance Design in the Presence of Safety Nets
Tse-Ling Teh∗
Abstract
Safety net assistance and insurance exist to manage risk and improve
welfare. This shared goal may lead to crowding out. In a new approach,
this paper analyzes the interaction of assistance with two dimensions
of insurance design: level of coverage and types of risks covered. In a
society of risk averse vulnerable individuals and risk neutral assistance
providers, Pareto improvements in welfare are achieved through incom-
pleteness in the types of risks covered. The results imply that safety
nets promote demand for and the emergence of incomplete insurance.
These results have a wide application to insurance markets where safety
nets are available, including health care, disaster aid and social welfare.
1 Introduction
Safety net assistance exists to protect against hardship and can be found in
health care, disaster aid, retirement pensions and social welfare. However,
the presence of safety nets can lead to a Samaritan's Dilemma (Buchanan
∗Columbia University in the City of New York, 420 W 118th St, New York, NY 10027,
USA. Present address: London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton St,
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1975). When safety net assistance provides protection against risk, individual
demand for insurance against such risks may be limited (Coate 1995).1 A
commitment not to provide safety net assistance would lead to an alleviation
of these ineﬃciencies. However, such a commitment may not be possible when
faced with social need.
An alternative is to examine the way in which insurance is contracted. My
paper explores two design aspects of insurance contracts. The ﬁrst is the cov-
erage level and the second is risk partitioning. The ﬁrst is common to the
literature (Coate 1995, Kaplow 1991, Lewis and Nickerson 1989), whilst the
second is new. Risk partitioning is deﬁned as partitioning states into those
that are covered by the insurance contract and those that are not. For clarity
I term an insurance with risk partitioning as incomplete insurance. An in-
creasing level of incompleteness refers to more states excluded from coverage.2
An example of incomplete insurance is an insurance contract that covers the
destruction of a house in the event of a ﬁre but not in the event of a ﬂood. In
this example, ﬁre risk is in the set of covered risks and ﬂood risk is in the set
of risks that is not covered.
My ﬁndings demonstrate how incomplete insurance bridges the gap in insur-
ance demand created by safety nets, by creating demand for incompleteness
over completeness. The rationale of the result is driven by two factors. The
ﬁrst is that a safety net provides implicit subsidization of incomplete insurance
but not complete insurance. The second is that there are decreasing marginal
returns to completeness under full coverage. Each factor alone drives a wedge
in the preference for incompleteness over completeness. When both factors
feature in the insurance design, the eﬀect on preferences is ampliﬁed.
These ﬁndings have implications for both the structure of insurance markets
1Examples of markets where insurance and safety net assistance coincide are: private
health insurance and public health systems (Gruber and Simon 2008, Herring 2005, Rask
and Rask 2000), and private disaster insurance and government disaster assistance (Brunette
et al. 2013, Brunette and Couture 2008 Kunreuther et al. 1978).
2In contrast, complete insurance is where all states are covered by insurance.
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and for the inception of insurance markets. Firstly, the ﬁndings demonstrate
that the supply of incomplete insurance can be a demand driven phenomenon.
Further, and somewhat surprisingly, incomplete insurance can increase welfare
of both the vulnerable party and providers of the safety net. To my knowledge,
this demand side reason for the existence of incomplete insurance has not been
identiﬁed in the literature. The reasons for the development of incomplete
products have tended to rest on the supply rather than the demand side. For
example, incompleteness alleviates risks faced by the insurer associated with
adverse selection and moral hazard (Doherty and Richter 2002), as well as
covariant losses (Jaﬀee and Russell 1997). In contrast, these ﬁndings show
that in the presence of a safety net, a potential assistance recipient will prefer
incomplete insurance over complete insurance, generating demand.
Secondly, the ﬁndings oﬀer a method to Pareto improve welfare in the face of
the Samaritan's Dilemma. In situations where assistance crowds out insurance
demand, an incomplete product improves welfare for both assistance recipients
and providers. The introduction of incomplete insurance aims to complement
existing assistance by allowing the transfer of some risk and generates demand
when none would otherwise exist. This can be a particularly useful policy tool
to complement assistance programs or in new markets. For example, in the face
of emerging risks that are only recently quantiﬁable, such as environmental and
climate change risks, insurance markets can be slow to develop. Incompleteness
can reduce the risk borne by the insurance provider and increase demand for
insurance, whilst not neglecting the beneﬁts of assistance.
The consideration of risk partitioning is new to the literature on safety nets and
insurance. Previous studies have focused on the interaction between the cov-
erage level of insurance, and assistance (Coate 1995, Kaplow 1991, Lewis and
Nickerson 1989).3 Coate (1995) analyzes a market with indemnity (complete)
insurance and shows that the possibility of assistance leads to an individual
3Incompleteness in the coverage level is also known as partial insurance. In this paper, full
coverage is referred to as suﬃcient insurance, to diﬀerentiate it from the second dimension
of incompleteness, risk partitioning.
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either insuring their entire loss or not insuring at all. Lewis and Nickerson
(1989) and Kaplow (1991) also examine the interaction of insurance and char-
ity in the context of self-insurance and moral hazard, respectively. Lewis and
Nickerson show that levels of self-insurance decrease under assistance availabil-
ity. Whilst Kaplow shows moral hazard is generated by any positive amount
of government assistance even if ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation. My analysis
is distinguished from these existing models, by the additional examination of
risk partitioning as a contractual component of the insurance design. By in-
corporating incompleteness through risk partitioning, this paper is the ﬁrst to
demonstrate that incompleteness has a large impact on insurance demand in
the shadow of a safety net.
Section two of this paper provides a description of how the vulnerable party,
donor and insurer are modeled. The timing of the model is also described,
with an emphasis placed on the ex-post and safety net nature of assistance
from the altruistic donor. Section three provides a summary of the insurance
demand of the vulnerable party in terms of the two dimensions of incomplete-
ness (coverage and risk partitioning) and the welfare impacts on the donor.
These results are then extended to consider the how the safety net changes
the value of insurance, whilst Section four concludes.
2 Model of the Interaction Between Assistance
and Insurance
The model measures welfare in an expected-utility framework and is simpliﬁed
to include a vulnerable party who is at risk (denoted by the subscript v) and
a donor (assistance provider) who is not at risk (denoted by the subscript d).4
The vulnerable party is risk averse, able to purchase insurance at an actuarially
4In Coate (1995) the vulnerable individual is termed the poor person and the donor is
termed the rich person.
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fair rate and receive assistance.
The donor provides assistance if it is of beneﬁt to them and it is assumed that
it is not of beneﬁt to the donor to provide assistance if no risk materializes.5
As in Coate (1995), the donor is risk neutral and empathetic towards the
vulnerable party. The assumption of the donor as risk neutral is not strictly
necessary in the model, however it simpliﬁes the calculations without losing
insight. Here the donor is imagined as a government, organization or rich
individual, in these cases risk neutrality is not uncommon. The implications
of the donor's utility function is that the donor prefers the vulnerably party
to reach a safety net level of welfare. This is justiﬁable from a humanistic
perspective, since such assistance has a moral foundation and can foster a
stable society. Further examples are provided in Section three.
The new innovation in this model is the second dimension of incompleteness,
established by partitioning risks into a set that is covered and a set that is not.
The probability of a risk being excluded is denoted by γ, and represents the
level of incompleteness in the insurance contract. For example, homeowners
insurance is often contracted with a set of risks that are covered and a set
that are not. In a standard contract, home damage due to ﬁre and vandalism
is often covered, but damage due to ﬂood and earthquake are not. With the
exclusion of ﬂood and earthquake risk, home owners insurance is incomplete.
The risks that are not covered are considered to be excluded and are expressed
in the insurance contract through the exclusion clause.
Within the model, there are two probabilities of interest. The ﬁrst probability
is the probability of loss, denoted pi. The second probability is the probability
of claim exclusion, denoted γ ∈ [0, 1).6 The intersection of these probabilities
creates three possible states: state one where there is no loss (probability 1−pi),
5In Coate (1995) there is a government that allows transfers from the rich to poor, to
ensure that this is true.
6Note that γ is a conditional probability. That is conditional on a loss, the probability
that the claim is excluded.
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state two where there is a loss and a claim is paid (probability pi(1− γ)) and
state three where there is a loss and no claim is paid (probability piγ). Within
these states of the world, it is assumed that the donor may provide assistance
in state two and state three only. When γ = 0, the insurance is complete.
The order of decisions is important in determining the outcome of the model.
For a ﬁxed level of incompleteness (γ), the timing of decisions is as follows:
1. The vulnerable party chooses their level (z) of insurance coverage. This
relates to the level of coverage, partial (z < L) or suﬃcient (z = L).
2. Nature chooses whether the risk occurs or not. That is, loss or no loss. In
the case of a risk materializing, a cost of loss (L) is inﬂicted on the vulnerable
party.
3. Nature chooses how the loss is incurred, that is whether the insurance claim
is paid (for example, does the loss fall within the exclusion?).
4. The donor decides how much assistance (τ) to provide.
5. The payoﬀs are concluded.
The main points of this sequence are that when the donor provides assistance
they are aware of the level of income facing the vulnerable party and the state
of the world, but when the vulnerable party chooses their level of insurance
they are unaware of the future state of the world. In other words, the donor
provides ex-post assistance and cannot commit to not providing assistance. In
this model, the level of assistance depends on the individual's level of insurance
and the empathy of the donor. This implies an endogenous form of limited
liability, thereby taking into account a range of assistance levels.
The vulnerable party has an income level yv and the donor has an income level
yd.
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The vulnerable party has utility u(.), where u′(.) > 0 and u”(.) < 0. Under
incomplete insurance (γ > 0), the expected utility of the vulnerable party is
deﬁned as:
E
[
uIv
]
= (1− pi)u(yv − pi(1− γ)z) (2.1)
+pi(1− γ)u(yv − pi(1− γ)z + z − L+ τa)
+piγu(yv − pi(1− γ)z − L+ τb)
where τa and τb is the assistance provided in state two and three respectively.
The vulnerable party's welfare aﬀects the donor's welfare at a weight of δ and
assistance has a marginal cost of one.7
The welfare of the donor is deﬁned as:
W Id = yd − τ + δuIv (2.2)
where τ is the level of assistance, δ is the level of empathy for the vulnera-
ble party by the donor, and uIv is the utility of the vulnerable party under
incomplete insurance.
Under complete insurance the loss is fully covered by insurance. This implies
γ = 0 and the expected utility of the vulnerable party becomes:
E
[
uCv
]
= (1− pi)u(yv − piz) + piu(yv − piz + z − L+ τac) (2.3)
Where τac is the amount of assistance provided by the donor when complete
insurance is available.
7Note that δ need not be less than 1 since the vulnerable party's utility has not been
scaled relative to the donor's utility.
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And equivalently the welfare of the donor is:
WCd = yd − τac + δuCv (2.4)
The complete model follows a similar framework to Coate (1995). However,
since the focus of this paper is on welfare comparison between insurance types,
the model has been simpliﬁed. In particular, the government and government
transfer found in the Coate model have been removed.
The description of the complete and incomplete models in this section creates
the framework for analysis in the following section. The complete model is
derived directly from the incomplete model by setting γ = 0. It nonetheless
represents the more commonly described model of insurance in the literature
since it reﬂects an indemnity insurance product. However, constraining the
insurance design to complete products limits the analysis of optimal contracts.
The model presented here provides two dimensions of ﬂexibility in determining
the optimal contract, the ﬁrst through the coverage level z, and the second by
partitioning the type of risk γ.
3 Results
The results are separated into four subsections. The ﬁrst subsection describes
the construction of safety net assistance. The second considers the vulnerable
party and their actions; whilst the third considers the welfare of donors. The
results of the ﬁrst three subsections provide the main theorem of the paper.
Notably, the resolution of the vulnerable party's insurance choice proves that
when complete insurance is ﬁrst crowded out, any incomplete insurance prod-
uct still appeals to the vulnerable party. This leads to the main theorem and
implies that assistance encourages the supply of incomplete insurance. Within
these subsections it is assumed that the insurer sets the insurance contract,
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and hence γ cannot be manipulated by the vulnerable party.8 The fourth
subsection considers how behavior changes with changes in the level of donor
empathy. This reﬂects the impact of changing the safety net level and how
this interacts with the vulnerable party's insurance decision.
The vulnerable party's dual goal of wealth maximization and protection from
risk provides the intuition underlying the main theorem. Risk aversion cre-
ates a competition between reliance on the safety net and protection through
insurance. Incomplete insurance supplies a cheaper, but less comprehensive
form of protection than complete insurance and aﬀects the vulnerable party's
behavior through the implicit subsidization of premiums and the diminishing
marginal returns to completeness. These two impacts reinforce each other to
result in Lemma 1, that shows incomplete insurance is preferred to complete
insurance at the point of indiﬀerence over complete insurance purchase.
3.1 Safety net assistance
The insurance demand of the vulnerable party depends on the anticipation of
assistance from the donor. As described in the section above, a donor only
provides assistance in the event of a loss. In other words, I assume the marginal
beneﬁt in the event of a loss is greater than the marginal cost, δu′(yv−L) > 1.
Second, it is assumed that donor does not wish to provide assistance to the
vulnerable party if they are fully insured, and assistance is not provided at a
level to replace insurance entirely, that is δu′(yv −E(L)) < 1. This allows the
proceeding analysis to focus on the interesting cases where safety net assistance
is provided when there is a loss.
Proposition 1. The donor provides assistance to ensure the vulnerable party
has a target wealth level, w, corresponding to their level of empathy, δ, where
w is deﬁned by δu′v(w) = 1.
8Comparative statics are in Teh (2015).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 reﬂects that the donor is altruistic and concerned about absolute
poverty rather than relative poverty. This means that regardless of the pre-
loss income of a vulnerable party, if the vulnerable party's income falls below a
threshold following a loss event the donor will provide assistance. Eﬀectively,
the donor does not take into account the pre-loss income of the vulnerable
party. A donor with a diﬀerent welfare function could consider the pre-loss
income of the vulnerably party to vary the level of assistance.
Eﬀectively, the donor aims to ensure a safety net level of assistance. Safety
net assistance ensures that all citizens have at least a certain level of welfare.
In this model, the focus is on a subsistence level of income or beneﬁts to
bring individuals up to a certain level of income. An example of an income
based safety is the Australian Newstart allowance provides a base income to
individuals seeking full time work based on their assets and fortnightly income
(Social Security Act 1991). Another example is social housing in the United
Kingdom, that provides low rent accommodation to citizens who are unable to
aﬀord private rents (eﬀectively increasing income).9 However, safety nets can
also be in kind and justiﬁed by equality of opportunity, for example universal
health care and education (Gasparini and Pinto 2006).
3.2 The vulnerable party's insurance demand
Proposition 2. Under incomplete insurance, the vulnerable party optimizes
by purchasing no insurance or more than suﬃcient insurance when assistance
is anticipated.
Proof. See Appendix.
9Social housing became the responsibility of government in the Housing Act 1919; see
Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2007) for more information.
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The term suﬃcient insurance is used to describe insurance coverage equal to
the level of loss, that is z = L.10 More than suﬃcient insurance refers to
the case where z > L. Under incomplete insurance a vulnerable party will
optimize by purchasing no coverage or more than suﬃcient insurance (z > L).
In situations where assistance crowds out insurance coverage, zero coverage
will be purchased. On the other hand, if insurance coverage is not crowded
out, the optimal level of coverage is more than suﬃcient coverage since in eﬀect,
assistance subsidizes the purchase of incomplete insurance on the margin. In
the event of a loss, an individual improves their welfare by purchasing more
than suﬃcient incomplete insurance in the state where there is a payment. If
there is no payment, the vulnerable party receives assistance and this oﬀsets
the premium payment. As such, the expected net payment from more than
suﬃcient insurance compensates above the increase in the amount paid in
premium.
Although demand for more than suﬃcient insurance is generated by the incom-
plete insurance contract, it should be noted that this is a technicality rather
than a driver of the results in the paper. The incomplete contract could be
designed as a contingent premium, such that no premium is charged in the
state with loss but no payment.11To distinguish this from the original con-
tract, this insurance is termed the net of premium contract. This would lead
to the vulnerable party optimizing by purchasing no insurance or suﬃcient
insurance, as shown in Figure 3.2. Equivalent results for Lemmas 2 and 3,
and Theorem 1 under a net of premium contract are possible, although the
beneﬁts of incomplete contracts are reduced. These results are shown in the
Appendix. This shows that, although important, the subsidization of incom-
plete contracts created by assistance is not the sole driver of the results. One
10This is equivalent to the ﬁrst dimension of incompleteness that considers the level of
coverage.
11Equivalent results can be found leading to either suﬃcient or zero coverage under the
incomplete product by altering the way the insurance premium is charged. If no premium
is charged in the state with loss but no payment, then the actuarially fair premium would
be set to P˜ = pi(1−γ)1−piγ z. Thus, the limitation to suﬃcient insurance can equally be obtained
by design of the insurance product.
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type of contingent premium is found in long-term-care insurance, where premi-
ums are paid only in the no loss state (Jaspersen and Richter 2015). However,
the product described in Section 2 is more common and easily recognized as
an insurance contract.
Proposition 3. Under complete insurance, the vulnerable party optimizes by
purchasing no insurance or suﬃcient insurance when assistance is anticipated.
Proof. This can be easily shown by setting γ = 0 in the proof of Proposition
2.
Figure 3.1: Expected utility under varying levels of insurance coverage
Figure 3.1 illustrates Propositions 2 and 3. The Figure shows the expected
utility of the vulnerable party over varying levels of insurance coverage for
diﬀerent levels of incompleteness (γ). The darkest curve represents complete
insurance γ = 0, and incompleteness increases (γ increases) as the curve be-
comes lighter. Each curve represents a diﬀerent insurance product and the
optimal level of coverage is found by ﬁnding the highest point on each curve.
From Figure 3.1 (for this particular case), it can be seen that the optimum
level of coverage is initially zero for complete insurance and some levels of in-
completeness. However, for some levels of incompleteness, it becomes optimal
to purchase insurance.
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The initial downward trend in utility is caused by the crowding out of assis-
tance by insurance purchase. The turning point in the curve is the point at
which insurance no longer crowds out assistance and expected utility begins
to increase with insurance coverage. The shape of the curve following this
turning point represents the traditional response to insurance purchase. For
complete insurance (γ = 0), the turning point represents the point when there
is zero provision of assistance. Insurance coverage has completely crowded out
assistance. For incomplete insurance (γ > 0), the turning point represents the
point at which assistance has been crowded out in the second state. However,
there is still charitable provision in the third state. The uninsurability of the
third state, determines that assistance will be provided when incomplete insur-
ance is purchased. Hence, incomplete insurance may provide higher expected
utility across all levels of insurance coverage.
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Figure 3.2: Expected utility under varying levels of insurance coverage (net of
premium contract)
The combination of Propositions 1, 2, and 3, show that although the vulner-
able party could choose any level of insurance, their optimum can only be at
two levels of coverage under each product. This is due to the nature of the
assistance provided by the donor, as a pure altruist. This simpliﬁes the anal-
ysis of welfare under these products, as there are only three coverage levels
that are of concern. These are no coverage, suﬃcient coverage in the case of
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complete insurance and more than suﬃcient coverage in the case of incomplete
insurance.
The vulnerable party's insurance demand depends upon the type of insurance
oﬀered and the level of safety net assistance determined by the target wealth
level in Proposition 1. On the one hand, the vulnerable party is risk averse
and is therefore attracted to the protection of suﬃcient complete insurance.
But on the other, incomplete insurance provides some protection and the pos-
sibility of using the safety net, making it a cheaper product at the expense
of full protection. The vulnerable party's insurance decision balances these
competing forces and will depend on the shape of an individual's utility curve.
Lemma 1. When the level of assistance ﬁrst precludes the purchase of com-
plete insurance, the vulnerable party would purchase incomplete insurance.
Proof. See Appendix.
The vulnerable party's insurance decision as determined in Lemma 1 is driven
by two factors intersecting with risk aversion. The ﬁrst is the implicit sub-
sidization of incomplete premiums by the safety net and the second is the
decreasing marginal returns to completeness. Either of these factors alone
leads to Lemma 1, however together the eﬀects are reinforced.12 The eﬀect of
implicit subsidization on the expected utility can be seen by the diﬀerence in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Whilst the diminishing marginal returns to incomplete-
ness eﬀect is observed in 3.2.
Although the premium is assumed to be actuarially fair, the eﬀective premium
faced by the vulnerable party includes an absolute loading and subsidy created
by assistance. Consider, the premium (P ) charged by an insurer neglecting
the safety net: P = pi(1− γ)z. This premium is actuarially fair. However, for
any level of coverage below z¯, where z¯ = w−(yv−L)
1−pi(1−γ) , coverage directly crowds
12In the net-of-premium contract (with premium P˜ ), only the second factor is present.
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out assistance. Thus, paying the premium for coverage up until level z¯ acts as
a premium loading that the vulnerable party must pay before they can receive
some beneﬁt. Because this loading does not depend on the level of coverage,
above z¯, it is in a sense an absolute premium loading that the vulnerable party
must pay.
On the other side, the implicit subsidization of incomplete insurance by the
safety net can be illustrated by considering the expected premium (PE). When
the vulnerable party suﬀers a loss, but does not receive a payoﬀ, their wealth
is topped up to w and this top up includes the premium. This means that the
vulnerable party does not pay the premium if there is a loss but no payout.
Thus, the expected premium payment is: PE = (1 − piγ)(pi(1 − γ)z). For
complete insurance, γ = 0 and P = PE.
The eﬀective premium can be rewritten as the sum of a relative and an absolute
loading, along with a subsidy:
PE = (1− piγ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Subsidy
pi(1− γ)(z − z¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative loading
+ pi(1− γ)z¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Absolute loading
 (3.1)
Equation 3.1, shows the relative loading, the absolute loading, and the subsidy.
The ﬁrst term is the subsidy, which comes from the probability the premium
is not paid. This subsidy reduces the relative and absolute loadings. The
second term is the relative loading, this reﬂects the cost of insurance past the
point of crowding out. The last term is the absolute loading, which reﬂects
the premium that must be paid to get the level of payout up to the threshold.
Lemma 1 illustrates that when the vulnerable party is just indiﬀerent between
buying complete insurance and relying on assistance, then any incomplete in-
surance will be preferred by the vulnerable party. One of the main drivers
of this result is the way incomplete insurance subsidizes the premium, as dis-
cussed above. However, Lemma 1 also holds without this subsidization. The
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reason for this is the diminishing marginal utility of a dollar.
In a standard insurance contract, an individual often chooses the level of cov-
erage (how much of a payout is received in the case of loss). However, in
incomplete insurance, the types of states covered by insurance can also be a
choice variable. For example, the level of incompleteness can be determined
through a choice of exclusions in an insurance contract. As with any other
good, the more spent on insurance coverage (as in the number of states cov-
ered, or completeness) the higher the premium paid. For each additional slice
of completeness, the marginal value of a dollar increases which lowers the
relative value of additional insurance.
To make this clearer, consider the net of premium contract, with insurance
premium P˜ = pi(1−γ)
1−piγ z, where z is the level of coverage. This premium removes
the subsidization eﬀect caused by assistance. It is easy to show that under the
net of premium contract, for any γ, the optimal level of insurance is z = L when
the vulnerable party chooses to insure.13 Also note that, the net of premium
contract is the complete contract when γ = 0. Fix the level of insurance
at z = L, and consider how the utility of the vulnerable party changes as γ
changes. This change may be positive or negative, but the second derivative
of this change is negative. This means utility is concave in γ, so there are
decreasing marginal returns to completeness. A further implication of this is
that if the vulnerable party is indiﬀerent between complete insurance and no
insurance, then by the concavity of utility, insurance must be optimal under
any γ ∈ (0, 1).
13This is shown in the Appendix under Theorem 2.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the utility between complete and incomplete insur-
ance
As before, the target wealth level w is deﬁned as the minimum wealth that
the donor would ensure the vulnerable party has, given their level of empathy
δ.14 Figure 3.3 shows the optimal utility at diﬀerent target wealth levels for
the vulnerable party under incomplete insurance (dashed curve) and complete
insurance (solid curve). The incomplete insurance in the ﬁgure has a ﬁxed
level of incompleteness, γ and is compared to complete insurance, γ = 0. For
a target wealth level of assistance above w∗, assistance crowds out all insur-
ance in both incomplete and complete insurance. For the section (w∗∗, w∗),
assistance crowds out complete insurance but not incomplete insurance (that
is if both products are oﬀered only the incomplete product will be purchased).
For (w′, w∗∗) assistance no longer crowds out insurance, however incomplete
insurance provides higher utility as compared to the complete insurance. For
a target wealth level of assistance below w′ complete insurance is preferred.
Lemma 2. The level of assistance to induce the purchase of complete insur-
ance is less than the level of assistance to induce the purchase of incomplete
insurance.
Lemma 2 is implied by Lemma 1. Figure 3.3 indicates that complete insurance
14The target wealth level is a net level of wealth for the vulnerable party; after losses,
income and assistance.
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is purchased up to the point where assistance provides a target wealth level of
w∗∗ and incomplete insurance is purchased up to the point where assistance
provides a target wealth level of w∗.
Combining Proposition 2, 3 and Lemma 1 provides the following summary of
optimal behavior.
For a target wealth level w:
1. For w > w∗: the vulnerable party optimizes to have zero coverage under
complete insurance (zC = 0) and zero coverage under incomplete insurance
(zI = 0).
2. For w∗ > w > w∗∗ : the vulnerable party optimizes to have zero cover-
age under complete insurance (zC = 0) and more than suﬃcient incomplete
insurance (zI = L˜).
3. For w∗∗ > w: the vulnerable party optimizes to have suﬃcient coverage
under complete insurance (zC = L) and more than suﬃcient incomplete in-
surance (zI = L˜).
This behavior is summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary of Vulnerable Party Behavior
Target assistance level w Complete insurance Incomplete insurance
w > w∗ zC = 0 zI = 0
w∗ > w > w∗∗ zC = 0 zI = L˜
w∗∗ > w zC = L zI = L˜
An implication of Lemma 2 is the current format of the disaster insurance
market. In numerous countries including the United States and Australia,
homeowners insurance is designed so that natural disasters are excluded from
generic insurance. The literature often points to these exclusions as supply
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driven. However, Lemma 2 suggests that such exclusions can be seen as both
a result of demand in the market and the result of proﬁt maximizing insurance
companies. If insurance companies are aware of the existence of assistance in
the face of natural disasters, it is more proﬁtable to provide an incomplete
insurance product, as this will have higher demand than a complete insurance
product. Thus the speciﬁc exclusion of natural disasters from these insurance
products can be seen as an example of the application of Lemma 2.
The following subsection considers the impact of incomplete insurance on
donor's welfare. In order to assess donor welfare, I limit the amount of in-
surance a vulnerable party can purchase to suﬃcient insurance. More than
suﬃcient insurance is equivalent to insuring more than the loss value. Oppor-
tunities to purchase such an insurance contract are rare. For this reason, the
limit of insurance coverage to a suﬃcient level is implemented. This assump-
tion however, is not material to the results of Lemma 1 and 2, as discussed
this Section and proven in the Appendix. The subscript l in wl indicates when
the results require that the maximum possible level of coverage is equal to the
loss value.
3.3 The donor's welfare
The donor's welfare depends upon the welfare of the vulnerable party and the
cost of assistance, as deﬁned in Equations 2.2 and 2.4.
Proposition 4. Under either type of insurance, donor welfare is higher with
suﬃcient insurance than with zero insurance.
Proof. Under complete insurance, Proposition 4 holds since insurance directly
compensates the vulnerable individual for losses, thereby reducing the amount
of direct relief necessary from donors.
See Appendix for the proof under incomplete insurance.
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Proposition 4 illustrates that the transfer of some risk to the insurer, lessens the
responsibility of the donor through assistance. The reduction of implicit risk
born by the donor improves their welfare, as it reduces the cost of maintaining
the safety net level of welfare for the vulnerable party.
Proposition 5. Under incomplete insurance, when the vulnerable party buys
insurance the donor's welfare is lowered by the allowance of more than suﬃ-
cient insurance.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 establishes that donor welfare strictly decreases if vulnerable
parties are provided the opportunity to purchase more than suﬃcient insur-
ance. The rationale behind this proposition is that in the event of a loss
without a claim the donor is forced to compensate the vulnerable party for
their loss of premium since they cannot commit to not providing assistance.
When provided the opportunity to purchase more than suﬃcient insurance,
vulnerable parties can exploit assistance to gain greater beneﬁts in the state
with a payout. The beneﬁt of purchasing excessive insurance in this state is
greater than the harm in other states.
Lemma 3. Comparison of welfare under varying levels of assistance.
(i) If w > w∗l , the welfare of the donor is independent of the type of
insurance.
(ii) If w∗l > w > w
∗∗
l , the welfare of the donor is higher when incomplete
insurance is available rather than complete.
(iii) If w∗∗l > w, the welfare of the donor is higher when complete insur-
ance is available rather than incomplete.
where w∗l is the target wealth level where the vulnerable party ceases to purchase
any insurance.
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and w∗∗l is the target wealth level where the vulnerable party's optimal utility
is achieved by purchasing incomplete insurance (limited to suﬃcient coverage)
Proof. See Appendix.
Table 3.2: Summary of Donor welfare
Target assistance level w Donor welfare
w > w∗l welfare equal under both contracts
w∗l > w > w
∗∗
l welfare higher under incomplete insurance
w∗∗l > w welfare higher under complete insurance
In case (i), the vulnerable party has zero insurance coverage and relies entirely
on assistance and thus the welfare is the same under either type of insurance.
In case (ii), the vulnerable party has suﬃcient incomplete insurance but zero
complete insurance, under Proposition 4 the purchase of insurance is welfare
enhancing for the donor. In case (iii), the vulnerable party purchases suﬃcient
insurance coverage. Under complete insurance the vulnerable party does not
rely on assistance at all, whereas under incomplete insurance the vulnerable
party still relies on assistance in the situation of no payout. Hence, the donor's
welfare is higher when they do not need to provide assistance, that is, when
complete insurance is purchased.
Theorem 1. When the level of assistance ﬁrst precludes the purchase of com-
plete insurance, any type of incomplete insurance is welfare enhancing and
Pareto improving.
Theorem 1 follows directly from Lemma 3. Lemma 3 indicates that for
w > w∗∗l , welfare is higher under incomplete insurance. Since w
∗∗
l is the level
of assistance under which the individual chooses not to purchase complete
insurance, Theorem 1 follows.
Theorem 1 determines that within a safety net framework, donor welfare is
enhanced by the presence of an incomplete insurance product. The level of
21
incompleteness of the product depends upon the extent of empathy, δ, the
donor exhibits and the ratio of loss size to wealth of the vulnerable party.
One implication of Theorem 1 is that in markets where insurance competes
with assistance, incomplete insurance products are likely to be more prevalent
than complete insurance. Consider ﬁrst insurance markets without assistance,
for example life insurance and car insurance. Life insurance policies tend to
have a single outright exclusion, the suicide clause. That can be explained
as a way to minimize moral hazard.15 It is not common for chronic illness to
be excluded from life insurance. Rather these conditions may lead to a risk
adjusted premium.16 Similarly, there are few exclusions under car insurance.17
This is curious because it is arguable that car insurers are susceptible to moral
hazard and adverse selection, both of which can be combated through exclusion
clauses. Yet, there are very few exclusion clauses under car insurance.
In contrast, some typical exclusions from homeowners insurance include in-
clude earth movement, ﬂood, violent uprisings and armed hostilities, nuclear
radiation and ordinances by a government authority (Siemens et al. 2011).
Apart from the ﬁnal exclusion, this list of exclusions are emotive and it may
be expected that assistance will be available if one's home is destroyed (Vis-
cusi and Zeckhauser 2006). These exclusions class homeowners insurance as
incomplete and is in line with the implications of Theorem 1. Compared to car
and life insurance, homeowners insurance is more incomplete and this accords
with perceived assistance availability.18
Therefore, existing insurance markets indicate product availability consistent
with Theorem 1. Incomplete insurance is driven by the parameter γ , that
represents the degree of incompleteness and links the probability of coverage
15There is mixed evidence of the level of adverse selection in life insurance (He 2009).
16In many cases, HIV is also not excluded (Association of British Insurers 2016).
17The Aviva 2016 product only lists two exclusions: if the type of car use is not covered,
or the driver at the time of accident is not covered (Aviva Insurance Limited 2016).
18For example, van Asseldonk et al. (2002) ﬁnds continued belief in government disaster
relief for farmers despite repeated statements that such relief is unavailable.
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exclusion to premium levels. Theorem 1 illustrates that an incomplete insur-
ance product can be designed to induce insurance purchase when complete
insurance is ﬁrst crowded out by assistance and that such a product is welfare
enhancing.
3.4 The impact of the level of empathy on the value of
insurance
This subsection considers the impact of changes in δ, donor empathy. As
empathy increases, the target wealth level, w increases. The target wealth
level, w, determines the safety net level and in turn determines the optimal
level of insurance demand. As described in Lemma 2, for very high target
wealth levels w > w∗, neither insurance product is purchased and so there is
no impact on the value of insurance premiums. For very low target wealth
levels w < w∗∗ the vulnerable party insures suﬃciently and no safety net is
required.
As expected, the change in the donor's empathy diﬀerentially aﬀects the ex-
pected utility of the vulnerable party under complete and incomplete insur-
ance. Under complete insurance, an increase in donor empathy increases the
vulnerable party's expected utility until the point when insurance is purchased.
Whereas in the case of incomplete insurance, the vulnerable party's expected
utility increases at all levels of insurance coverage. The distinction is clear
in Figure 3.4. For three levels of empathy it is visible that under complete
insurance, expected utility varies only when no insurance is purchased, but
under incomplete insurance expected utility increases across all coverage lev-
els (incompleteness in this graph is set to γ = 0.2). The diﬀerence is due to the
improving value of incomplete insurance as compared to complete insurance
as the donor's empathy increases.
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Figure 3.4: The eﬀect of donor empathy on complete (on left) and incomplete
(on right) insurance
4 Conclusion
The provision of assistance to those in need is an instinctive response from in-
dividuals, institutions and governments alike. Policy interventions such as so-
cial welfare, public health care, subsidized insurance, social housing, bailouts,
disaster aid and public pensions all represent safety net assistance. The avail-
ability of a safety net prompts a Samaritan's Dilemma, and importantly acts as
a quasi-subsidy on insurance contracts for these risks. This leads to the Pareto
dominance of incomplete insurance over complete insurance, when safety nets
are available. The implication of these novel ﬁndings is that incomplete in-
surance will have greater demand in markets where safety net assistance is
available. Indicative evidence of this can be found in the contract structure of
homeowners insurance as compared to car insurance.
One particular example that has not been touched on in this paper is that
of government bailouts to companies and ﬁnancial institutions that would
otherwise collapse.19 In providing assistance the government is creating an
expectation of assistance in the future and has illustrated its inability to com-
mit to not providing assistance. Whether these actions are considered right
19For example, car manufacturers Chrysler (1980), banks Citigroup (2008).
24
or wrong, they nevertheless create a form of the Samaritan's Dilemma. Al-
though, the model presented in this paper is pared back to fundamentals, it
provides the intuition that could lead to market-based solutions. For instance,
the introduction of incomplete hedging/immunization mechanisms can encour-
age these entities to assume some of the risk that is currently being overlooked
and improve the welfare of the donor (in this case, the government).
Finally, the paper has provided a transparent theoretical model to illustrate
the welfare impact of a market with complete and incomplete insurance under
the Samaritan's Dilemma. In doing so, I have abstracted by using expected
utility and risk aversion to determine optimal actions of the vulnerable party.
An extension of this research is to include broader methods for decision making
under risk, such as generalized expected utility theory (Machina 1982), and
decision weights (Starmer 2000) would provide valuable additional insights.
The results would also garner additional value from an empirical test of the
results through either data or experimental work.
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A Appendix
Proposition 1.
Proof. The donor's welfare function is Wd = yd − τ + δuv. The donor will
choose to provide assistance up to the point where the marginal cost is equal
to the marginal beneﬁt of providing assistance. This ensures that the amount
of assistance will satisfy: δu′(yv(s) + τ) = 1 whenτ > 0 and δu′(yv(s) + τ) ≤ 1
when τ = 0, where yv(s) is the income of the vulnerable party in state s.
As previously, let w be deﬁned by δu′(w) = 1. w is the minimum level of
wealth the donor would ensure the vulnerable party has, given their level of
care δ.
Now assistance τ is deﬁned by:
τ =
w − yv(s) if yv(s) < w0 if yv(s) > w
This indicates that w is the lower bound on the amount of income a vulnerable
party receives.
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Proposition 2. Under incomplete insurance, the vulnerable party optimizes
by purchasing no insurance or more than suﬃcient insurance when assistance
is anticipated.
Proof. The level of optimal insurance depends upon the level of anticipated
assistance. First consider the assistance in state two of the world. In this case,
the vulnerable party receives an insurance payment for the amount insured,
but may also receive assistance. The donor will only provide assistance if it is
of beneﬁt to them. Thereby, the optimal level of assistance is,
τ ∗a = argmaxτa≥0{yd − τa + δu(yv + (1− pi(1− γ))z − L+ τa)}
Let w be deﬁned by δu′(w) = 1. w is the target wealth level (the minimum
level of wealth) that the donor would ensure the vulnerable party has, given
their level of care δ. The target wealth level sets the donor's marginal utility
of assistance gained equal to the marginal cost. At this point, the donor is
indiﬀerent between providing and not providing assistance. For notational
convenience, the δ subscript will be removed since each w corresponds to a
particular δ.
The optimal assistance level in state two of the world depends upon the extent
of insurance coverage purchased by the vulnerable party, and is deﬁned as
τ ∗a (z) = max{0, w − yv + L− (1− pi(1− γ))z}.
Next consider assistance in state three of the world. In this case even if the
vulnerable party purchased insurance since it is incomplete, no payment is
received despite being aﬀected by the risk occuring.
Analogously, the optimal level of assistance is
τ ∗b (z) = max{0, w − yv + L + pi(1− γ)z}. Since w − yv + L + pi(1− γ)z ≥ 0,
this can be simpliﬁed to τ ∗b (z) = w − yv + L + pi(1 − γ)z. In state three,
the vulnerable party always receives assistance and the amount depends upon
the vulnerable party's insurance coverage. This comes about because of the
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assumption made in section 3, that the donor will provide assistance when a
loss occurs. Also, the donor is concerned with the net level of the vulnerable
party's wealth, and hence will compensate for the loss of premium.
Based on these anticipated assistance levels, the optimal level of insurance
coverage (z∗) for the vulnerable individual can be determined.
z∗ = argmaxz≥0{pi(1− γ)u(yv + (1− pi(1− γ))z − L+ τ ∗a )
+piγu(yv − pi(1− γ)z − L+ τ ∗b ) (A.1)
+(1− pi)u(yv − pi(1− γ)z)}
Consider z for z ∈ [0, w−yv+L
1−pi(1−γ) ].
In this interval assistance crowds out insurance purchase one for one in loss
states and in the no loss state insurance purchase decreases utility. For z in
this interval an increase in the purchase of insurance decreases utility, so the
vulnerable party will not purchase insurance.
Consider z for z ∈ ( w−yv+L
1−pi(1−γ) ,L˜) where L˜ > L.
In this interval charitable transfers τ ∗a = 0. In the loss state with payment,
increasing z improves utility. In the loss state without payment, assistance
ensures a set level of utility. In the good state increasing insurance decreases
utility. The improvement in utility in the loss state increases at a faster rate
than it decreases in the good state. Thereby, an increase in insurance increases
expected utility. Since an increase in z increases expected utility, it is evident
that the vulnerable party will at least suﬃciently insure. However, due to the
incomplete nature of the insurance, it is of beneﬁt to insure beyond suﬃcient
insurance as shown by the ﬁrst order conditions below.
Consider when γ > 0 and the insurance is incomplete.
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The ﬁrst order condition with respect to z is:
du
dz
= −pi(1− pi)(1− γ)u′ (yv − pi(1− γ)z)
+pi(1− pi(1− γ))(1− γ)u′ (yv − L+ (1− pi(1− γ))z)
The second order condition with respect to z is:
d2u
dz2
= pi2(1− γ)2(1− pi)u′′ (yv − pi(1− γ)z)
+pi(1− γ) (1− pi(1− γ))2 u′′ (yv − L+ (1− pi(1− γ))z)
< 0
for all z > w−yv+L
1−pi(1−γ) , due to the concavity of the utility function u
′′(.) < 0.
At suﬃcient insurance du
dz
> 0.
pi(1− γ) [(1− pi) (u′(yv − L+ (1− pi(1− γ))z)− u′(yv − pi(1− γ)z))]
+pi(1− γ) [piγu′(yv − L+ (1− pi(1− γ))z)] > 0
for z = L.
L˜ is deﬁned as the point at which du
dz
= 0. Therefore, L˜ > L, hence the
optimal insurance for the vulnerable party is either no insurance or greater
than suﬃcient insurance.
Lemma 1. When the level of assistance ﬁrst precludes the purchase of com-
plete insurance, the vulnerable party would purchase incomplete insurance.
Proof. The donor will choose to provide assistance up to the point where the
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marginal cost is equal to the marginal beneﬁt of providing assistance. This
ensures that the amount of assistance will satisfy: δu′(yv(s) + τ) = 1, where
yv(s) is the income of the vulnerable party in state s.
As previously, let w be deﬁned by δu′(w) = 1. w is the minimum level of
wealth the donor would ensure the vulnerable party has, given their level of
care δ.
Now assistance τ is deﬁned by:
τ =
w − yv(s) if yv(s) < w0 if yv(s) > w
This indicates that w is the lower bound on the amount of income a vulnerable
party receives. Thus in every state of the world assistance will ensure that the
vulnerable party has at least w.
From Proposition 2 and 3, the optimal insurance level for the vulnerable party
under incomplete insurance is {0, L˜} and under complete insurance {0, L}.
Under Jensen's inequality if u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0 and L > 0, γ > 0, pi > 0.
u(yv−pi(1−γ)L) = u(γyv+(1−γ)yv−pi(1−γ)L) > γu(yv)+(1−γ)u(yv−piL)
(A.2)
Pick w∗∗ such that u(yv − piL) = (1 − pi)u(yv) + piu(w∗∗). This equation
equates the utility from suﬃcient insurance and no insurance. Thereby w∗∗
is the amount of assistance in the loss state that makes the vulnerable party
indiﬀerent between purchasing suﬃcient and no insurance under complete in-
surance.
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Consider w∗∗ in the case of incomplete insurance.
Assume the vulnerable party purchases suﬃcient incomplete insurance, the
expected utility is now:
E[uIv] = (1− pi)u(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
+pi(1− γ)u(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
+piγu(w∗∗)
Using Equation (A.2) provides:
E[uIv] > (1− pi)[γu(yv) + (1− γ)u(yv − piL)]
+pi(1− γ)u(yv − pi(1− γ)L) + piγu(w∗∗)
= pi(1− γ)u(yv − pi(1− γ)L) + (1− γ)(1− pi)u(yv − piL)
+γu(yv − piL)
= pi(1− γ)u(yv − pi(1− γ)L) + (1− pi(1− γ))u(yv − piL)
> u(yv − piL)
= E[uCv ]z=L
This indicates that the expected utility under incomplete insurance is higher
than complete insurance at the same level of assistance. From above, the
optimum level of insurance under incomplete insurance is {0, L˜}, where L˜ > L.
So it must be that at the optimum level of insurance E[uIv] > u(yv − piL) for
w∗∗. Therefore, there is a level of assistance for which it is optimal to purchase
incomplete insurance but not complete insurance.
Proposition 4. Under either type of insurance, donor welfare is higher with
suﬃcient insurance than with zero insurance.
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Proof. Let w be the target wealth level in the loss state.
With zero insurance
W Id,z=0 = yd − pi(w − yv + L) + (1− pi)δu(yv) + piδu(w)
= yd − pi(w − yv + L) + (1− pi)δu(yv) + (pi − piγ)δu(w) + piγδu(w)
Using Jensen's inequality on the conditional expectation we have:
(1− pi)yv + pi(1− γ)w = (1− piγ)x (A.3)
where, x = (1−pi)yv+pi(1−γ)w
1−piγ = yv +
pi(1−γ)
1−piγ (w − yv), which implies
W Id,z=0 ≤ yd − pi(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w)
+(1− piγ)δu
(
yv +
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ (w − yv)
)
= yd − pi(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w)
+(1− piγ)δu
(
yv +
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ (w − yv)
)
+(1− piγ)δ [u (yv − pi(1− γ)L)− u (yv − pi(1− γ)L)]
≤ yd − pi(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + (1− piγ)δu (yv − pi(1− γ)L)
+(1− piγ)
(
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ (w − yv) +
pi(1− γ)L(1− piγ)
1− piγ
)
≤ W Id,z=L
Since δu′(x) ≤ 1 when x > w.
Proposition 5. Under incomplete insurance, the donor's welfare is lowered
by the allowance of more than suﬃcient insurance.
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Proof. From Proposition 2, it has been shown that at the optimal a vulnerable
party would choose to insure more than suﬃcient incomplete insurance. Thus,
by continuity, when restricted to only purchase up to suﬃcient insurance a
vulnerable party would choose to purchase suﬃcient insurance.
Consider two levels of welfare:
W˜ Id : The level of welfare when the vulnerable party is able to purchase more
than suﬃcient insurance.
W Id : The level of welfare when the vulnerable party is limited to purchasing
no more than suﬃcient insurance.
W˜ Id = yd − piγ(w − yv + L+ pi(1− γ)L˜) + piγδu(w)
+pi(1− γ)δu(yv − L+ (1− pi(1− γ))L˜) + (1− pi)δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L˜)
And
W Id = yd − piγ(w − yv + L+ pi(1− γ)L) + piγδu(w)
+pi(1− γ)δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L) + (1− pi)δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
Taking the diﬀerence:
W˜ Id −W Id = pi2γ(1− γ)(L− L˜) + pi(1− γ)δu(yv − L+ (1− pi(1− γ))L˜)
+(1− pi)δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L˜)− (1− piγ)δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
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W˜ Id −W Id = pi2γ(1− γ)(L− L˜) + pi(1− γ)δu(yv − L+ (1− pi(1− γ))L˜)
+(1− pi)δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L˜)− (1− piγ)δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
= pi2γ(1− γ)(L− L˜)
+pi(1− γ)δ
[
u(yv − L+ (1− pi(1− γ))L˜)− δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
]
−(1− pi)δ
[
δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L)− u(yv − pi(1− γ)L˜)
]
< pi2γ(1− γ)(L− L˜) + pi(1− γ)δu′ (yv − pi(1− γ)L)
[
(1− pi(1− γ))(L˜− L)
]
−(1− pi)δu′ (yv − pi(1− γ)L)
[
pi(1− γ)(L˜− L)
]
= pi2γ(1− γ)(L− L˜) + pi2γ(1− γ)(L˜− L)δu′ (yv − pi(1− γ)L)
< 0
Noticing that the last line follows because δu′ (yv − pi(1− γ)L) ≤ 1 as yv −
pi(1− γ)L > w, so
W˜ Id < W
I
d .
Lemma 3. Comparison of welfare under varying levels of assistance.
(i) If w > w∗l , the welfare of the donor is the same.
(ii) If w∗l > w > w
∗∗
l , the welfare of the donor is higher when incomplete
insurance is available rather than complete.
(iii) If w∗∗l > w, the welfare of the donor is higher when complete insur-
ance is available rather than incomplete.
Proof. (i) can be achieved directly by noticing that neither insurance product
is desirable. The assistance level compensates the vulnerable party adequately
to make insurance purchase unnecessary.
(ii) requires some manipulation of welfare functions and the utilization of
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Jensen's inequality. Let w be the level of target wealth level in the loss state.
WCd = yd − pi(w − yv + L) + (1− pi)δu(yv) + piδu(w)
= yd − pi(w − yv + L) + (1− pi)δu(yv) + (pi − piγ)δu(w) + piγδu(w)
W Id = yd − piγ(w − yv + L+ pi(1− γ)L) + piγδu(w)
+pi(1− γ)δu (yv − pi(1− γ)L) + (1− pi)δu (yv − pi(1− γ)L)
Consider an insurance product as described in (A.3)
Using Jensen's inequality on the conditional expectation we have:
WCd ≤ yd − pi(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + (1− piγ)δu
(
yv +
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ (w − yv)
)
= yd − pi(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + (1− piγ)δu
(
yv +
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ (w − yv)
)
+(1− piγ)δ [u (yv − pi(1− γ)L)− u (yv − pi(1− γ)L)]
= yd − pi(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + (1− piγ)δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
+(1− piγ)
[
δu
(
yv +
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ (w − yv)
)
− δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
]
≤ yd − pi(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + (1− piγ)δu (yv − pi(1− γ)L)
+(1− piγ)δu′(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
(
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ (w − yv) + pi(1− γ)L
)
≤ yd − pi(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + (1− piγ)δu (yv − pi(1− γ)L)
+(1− piγ)
(
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ (w − yv) + pi(1− γ)L
)
= yd − piγ(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + (1− piγ)δu (yv − pi(1− γ)L)
≤ W Id
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The second and third inequalities use the fact that the donor does not provide
assistance when net income is above the target wealth level, that is δu′(t) ≤ 1
for t > w. In more detail, deﬁne
A ≡ (1 − piγ)
[
δu
(
yv +
pi(1−γ)
1−piγ (w − yv)
)
− δu(yv − pi(1− γ)L)
]
. Under (ii),
notice that A ≥ 0, since yv − L ≤ w, that is the target wealth level is larger
than the net income after loss. δu
(
yv +
pi(1−γ)
1−piγ (w − yv)
)
− δu(yv − pi(1 −
γ)L) represents the diﬀerence between two points on the δu(.) curve. Since
δu(.) is concave, this can be bounded by the tangent at the lowest point. In
other words, A ≤ δu′(yv−pi(1−γ)L)
(
yv +
pi(1−γ)
1−piγ (w − yv)− yv + pi(1− γ)L
)
.
Further, as yv − pi(1− γ)L > w, it follows that δu′(yv − pi(1− γ)L) ≤ 1 which
implies A ≤
(
yv +
pi(1−γ)
1−piγ (w − yv)− yv + pi(1− γ)L
)
.
(iii) can be shown using Jensen's inequality.
W Id = yd − piγ (w − yv + pi(1− γ)L+ L)
+δ [(1− piγ)u (yv − pi(1− γ)L) + piγu (w)]
≤ yd − piγ(w − yv + pi(1− γ)L+ L) + δu ((1− piγ)(yv − pi(1− γ)L) + piγw)
= yd − piγ(w − yv + pi(1− γ)L+ L)
+δu (yv − piL+ piγ(w − yv + pi(1− γ)L+ L))
= yd − piγ(w − yv + pi(1− γ)L+ L) + δu (yv − piL)
+ [δu (yv − piL+ piγ(w − yv + pi(1− γ)L+ L))− δu(yv − piL)]
< yd − piγ(w − yv + pi(1− γ)L+ L) + δu (yv − piL)
+δu′(yv − piL)piγ(w − yv + pi(1− γ)L+ L)
< yd + δu(yv − piL)
= WCd
Theorem 2 below illustrates the identical main results for the net of premium
contract. The net of premium contract removes the incentive for more than
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suﬃcient insurance coverage and the implicit subsidization of insurance by the
safety net. Nonetheless, as described in the paper the results still hold due to
the decreasing marginal returns to completeness. These results are formally
derived below with results equivalent to Lemma 1 and 3 embedded in the
proof.
Theorem 2. When the level of assistance ﬁrst precludes the purchase of com-
plete insurance, any type of net of premium incomplete insurance is welfare
enhancing and Pareto improving.
Theorem 2 is the equivalent statement of Theorem 1 for net of premium in-
complete insurance. The net of premium product is one in which the premium
is returned when there is a loss, but not payout. That is, in the state with
probability piγ, there is a return of premium. The actuarially fair rate of in-
surance for this product is pi(1−γ)
1−piγ z. Theorem 2 highlights the second intuition
of the results, that incomplete insurance provides more value for the insured
via the curvature of their utility function, not only through the subsidization
of insurance. That is this reﬂects the decreasing marginal returns to complete-
ness.
The donor's welfare function is as previous and assistance is in the form of a
target wealth level.
Proof. The vulnerable party's insurance demand is governed by:
z∗ = argmax
{
(1− pi)u
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ z
)
+ (1− γ)piu
(
yv + (1− pi(1− γ)
1− piγ )z − L+ τ
∗
a
)
+γpiu
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ z − L+ τ
∗
b
)}
So then the levels of net assistance are
τ ∗a = argmax
{
yd − τa + δu
(
yv +
1−pi
1−piγ z − L+ τa
)}
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τ ∗a = max
[
0, w − yv + L− 1−pi1−piγ z
]
and τ ∗b = max
[
0, w − yv + L+ pi(1−γ)1−piγ z
]
For z ∈
[
0, (w−yv+L)(1−piγ)
1−pi
]
there is a one to one crowd out eﬀect so zero
insurance coverage is optimal.
For z ∈
(
(w−yv+L)(1−piγ)
1−pi , L
)
there are increasing beneﬁts from insurance so
that the optimal insurance coverage is suﬃcient, that is z∗ = L, this is shown
through ﬁrst order conditions
E [uv] = (1−pi)u
(
yv − pi(1−γ)1−piγ z
)
+(1−γ)piu
(
yv + (1− pi(1−γ)1−piγ )z − L
)
+piγu (yv − L)
First order condition is:
duv
dz = −(1−pi)
(
pi(1−γ)
1−piγ
)
u′
(
yv − pi(1−γ)1−piγ z
)
+(1−γ)pi
(
1− pi(1−γ)1−piγ
)
u′
(
yv + (1− pi(1−γ)1−piγ )z − L
)
For z = L, duv
dz
= 0. Since u′′(.) < 0 this is the optimum. The optimal level of
coverage is no insurance (z = 0) or suﬃcient insurance (z = L).
Analogous to Theorem 1. I will begin by showing results equivalent to Lemma
1 and Lemma 3.
Begin with the new expected utility for the net of premium contract, at the
optimal level given insurance is purchased.
Let w∗∗ be deﬁned as the level of assistance in the loss states that makes the
vulnerable party indiﬀerent between purchasing suﬃcient and no insurance
under complete insurance. That is, u(yv − piL) = (1− pi)u(yv) + piu(w∗∗).
E[uIv] = (1− piγ)u
(
yv − pi(1−γ)1−piγ L
)
+ piγu (w∗∗)
Note that using Jensen's inequality:
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u(yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L) = u
(
(1− pi) γ
1− piγ yv +
(1− γ)
1− piγ yv −
pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L
)
>
(1− pi) γ
1− piγ u(yv) +
(1− γ)
1− piγ u(yv − piL)
So now by substituting for u
(
yv − pi(1−γ)1−piγ L
)
, we have
E[uIv] > (1− piγ)
[
(1− pi) γ
1− piγ u(yv) +
(1− γ)
1− piγ u(yv − piL)
]
+ piγu (w∗∗)
= γ [(1− pi)u(yv) + piu (w∗∗)] + (1− γ)u(yv − piL)
= γu(yv − piL) + (1− γ)u(yv − piL)
= E[uCv ]z=L
This is the analogy to Lemma 1.
Now turn to the donor's welfare.
First note, under the net of premium contract the welfare of the donor is now:
W I2d = yd − piγ(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + pi(1− γ)δu
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L
)
+(1− pi)δu
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L
)
= yd − piγ(w − yv + L) + piγδu(w) + (1− piγ)δu
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L
)
Previously W Id = yd−piγ(w−yv +L+pi(1−γ)L)+piγδu(w)+(1−piγ)δu(yv−
pi (1− γ)L)
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Note that W I2d ≥ W Id
Since
W I2d −W Id = pi2γ(1− γ)L− (1− piγ)
[
δu(yv − pi (1− γ)L)− δu
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L
)]
> pi2γ(1− γ)L− (1− piγ)δu′
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L
)
γpi2(1− γ)
1− piγ
> 0
i) is clear and ii) follows since W I2d ≥ W Id ≥ WCd .
iii) In this case, the vulnerably party purchases suﬃcient insurance under both
the complete and incomplete product. So then, the assistance provider does
not need to provide assistance in the case of complete insurance since the
target wealth level is below what the individual would receive net of insurance
payment.
W I2d = yd − piγ (w − yv + L) + δ
[
(1− piγ)u
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L
)
+ piγu (w)
]
= yd − piγ (w − yv + L) + δ(1− piγ)u
(
yv − pi(1− γ)
1− piγ L
)
+ δpiγu (w)
≤ yd − piγ (w − yv + L) + δu ((1− piγ)yv − pi(1− γ)L+ piγw)
= yd − piγ (w − yv + L) + δu(yv − piL)
+ [δu (yv − piL+ piγ(w − yv + L))− δu(yv − piL)]
< yd − piγ (w − yv + L) + δu(yv − piL) + δu′(yv − piL)piγ(w − yv + L)
< yd + δu(yv − piL)
= WCd
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